

Attitudes and Behaviour in the Referendum on the Treaty of Lisbon

Report prepared for the Department of Foreign Affairs

by

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- This is the final report of the Department of Foreign Affairs research on attitudes and behaviour in the 2008 referendum on the Treaty of Lisbon. The referendum was held on the 12th of June, 2008. Fieldwork for the study was conducted by Millward Brown IMS between the 24th and the 31st of July, 2008. The sample size was 2,101.
- 2. The result of the referendum was 52.3 per cent against ratification of the Lisbon Treaty to 47.7 per cent for. Turnout was 53.1 per cent. The purpose of this report is to analyse why people voted yes or no, or abstained in the referendum.
- 3. This analysis shows that the outcome of the referendum on the Lisbon Treaty was determined mainly by a combination of (a) overall attitudes to European integration, (b) knowledge or lack of knowledge of the European Union and correct and incorrect perceptions of what was in the Lisbon Treaty, (c) a number of specific policy concerns and (d) some domestic political factors.
- 4. The overall positive attitude that Irish people have towards the European Union contributed substantially to support for the Lisbon Treaty in the referendum and was indeed the strongest single factor affecting people's voting decision. This is an important finding because this widespread supportive attitude, which is regularly confirmed in Eurobarometer surveys, is sometimes dismissed as unlikely to have any impact on behaviour. This is clearly not the case.
- 5. A low level of knowledge about Europe and about the treaty had a double effect by, firstly, making people more likely to abstain and then, for those who did vote, increasing the likelihood of that vote being NO. In particular, low levels of overall knowledge of what was in the treaty had a very powerful effect on increasing the NO vote. This conclusion regarding the importance of knowledge is very robust in that it is confirmed by evidence ranging from responses to open-ended questions, on the one hand, to multivariate analysis using objective indicators of knowledge on the other.

- 6. Further statistical analysis showed that there were two dimensions of knowledge at work. The first was the degree to which a person perceived provisions to be in the treaty that *are* in the treaty¹. The second dimension was the extent to which people perceived things to be in the treaty that *are not* there, namely the introduction of conscription to a European army, the end of Ireland's control over its rate of corporate tax and the end of Irish control over its policy on abortion.
- 7. These two sub-sets of perceptions of the contents of the treaty had opposite effects on vote choice, a high score on the correct perception sub-set leading to a YES vote and a high score on the incorrect perception sub-set leading to a NO vote. The latter finding strongly suggests that the failure to convince or reassure people that the issues of corporate taxation, of abortion and of conscription were not in the Lisbon Treaty played a substantial role in the defeat of the ratification proposal.
- 8. Other aspects of attitudes to integration including a perception that the EU means lower wage rates, a desire to strengthen neutrality, anti-immigration sentiment and an exclusively Irish sense of identity also increased the propensity to vote NO.
- 9. In some of our analysis a perception that improved protection of workers' rights was contained in the treaty and/or a concern about the protection of workers' rights were shown to have some impact on voting decisions but any such effects tended to be subsumed into more general attitudes to integration once the latter were included in the models. However, in the context of and controlling for a limited number of mainly socio-economic variables, belief in the need for improved protection of workers' rights did lead to an increase in the NO vote.
- 10. Analysis also points to the differential effect of a number of socio-economic variables on the probability of voting NO. The variables are the belief that the EU means low wage rates, the occupational status of being a large farmer and

¹ These comprise strengthening role of national parliaments in EU decision-making, strengthening Europe's role in the world, increased efficiency of EU decision-making, Charter of Fundamental Rights, loss of Irish Commissioner for 5 out of every 15 years and reduction of Ireland's voting strength in the Council of Ministers

level of education. The fact that these effects are conditional on participation in the labour suggests that we should think of them as operating through labour market channels and as demonstrating the impact of economic interests on voting decisions. The fact that the education effect only works for those in the labour force is particularly noteworthy, as it suggests that it is not so much education per se that matters, but rather education as it relates to people's experience in the labour market. In the light of this we believe that education is acting here as a proxy for skill levels, as it has been shown to do in many international studies, and that, the higher the skill level, the less likely is it that the person involved will have voted NO in the referendum.

- 11. It should also be emphasised that the impact of occupationally-defined social class persisted through these various analyses and so could not be explained away by reference to less education or low skill or any of the other variables analysed.
- 12. In addition to the above, voters were concerned about two particular policy issues and both concerns tended to increase the NO vote. The first concern is about the scope of EU decision-making and the belief that too many issues are decided on by the EU. This belief contributed significantly to the NO vote.
- 13. The second policy-related concern has to do with the EU decision-making process and specifically with the issue of the rotating commissionership. Eighty per cent of Irish people believe that the commissionership is an important issue for Ireland; 65 per cent said it was an important issue in making up their minds how to vote and 17 per cent put it at the very top of their agenda of issues of importance to Ireland in the EU. A multivariate analysis controlling for a wide range of variables showed that the belief that it is important for Ireland to maintain a permanent presence in the Commission was a statistically significant and substantial consideration in leading people to vote NO.
- 14. The foregoing wide range of influences on the voters' decisions runs counter to the commonly held view that referendums in general and this referendum in particular are "really" decided by the balance of political forces at national level and have little to do with was the issues nominally at stake. It is indeed true that

domestic political factors played a role, a NO vote being more likely if a person felt close to an opposition party, or was dissatisfied with the government, or had a negative evaluation of their own economic situation. However, government satisfaction is clearly only one factor among these three and, indeed, one among many others, a point that is borne out by the record of the varying relationship between level of government satisfaction and EU referendum outcomes in Ireland between 1998 and 2008. In short, satisfaction with the government is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for winning a referendum on EU issues in Ireland.

15. The defeat by referendum of the proposal to ratify the Treaty of Lisbon in Ireland in June 2008 was the product of a complex combination of factors. These included attitudes to Ireland's membership of the EU, to Irish-only versus Irish-and-European identity and to neutrality. The defeat was heavily influenced by low levels of knowledge and by specific misperceptions in the areas of abortion, corporate taxation and conscription. Concerns about policy issues (the scope of EU decision-making and a belief in the importance of the country having a permanent commissioner) also contributed significantly and substantially to the treaty's downfall, as did the perception that the EU means low wage rates. Social class and more specific socio-economic interests also played a role, the latter being shown by the differential effects of certain variables conditional on participation/non-participation in the labour force. Finally, while domestic politics played a role, it was only one factor among many. The complexity just summarised is undeniable. Equally undeniable is the need to address the issues and the underlying processes involved, not just now and not just in the run-up to a referendum but on an on-going and long-term basis.

End executive summary

REPORT

Introduction

The purpose of this report is to analyse why people voted yes or no, or abstained in the referendum on the Treaty of Lisbon. The report relies mainly on the postreferendum survey commissioned by the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs² while also drawing on Eurobarometer and on constituency data and taking account of the results of other opinion polls conducted before and after the referendum. The data and methodology employed are explained in more detail below. First, however, we examine aspects of the background to the 2008 referendum, beginning with Irish attitudes to European integration or what might be called the political culture of European integration in Ireland.

The political culture of European integration in Ireland

Basic attitudes to the EU can be thought of in terms of evaluation, identity and knowledge. Over the years, each of these has been comprehensively documented by the Eurobarometer surveys carried out on behalf of the European Commission. In the 1970s and into the early 1980s, Irish evaluation of membership of the EEC, measured by a question as to whether membership was good/bad/neither was moderate and generally very close to the European average, though dipping significantly below that average in the early 1980s (see Figure 1). In tandem with the member state average, Irish support for membership then picked up and entered on a sustained rise that peaked in the mid 1990s. Since then it has experienced a slight decline that still leaves the Irish level of support for EU membership at or close to 70 per cent.

² The survey was conducted by Millward Brown Irish Marketing Surveys. Fieldwork was carried out between 24th and 31st July with an achieved sample of 2,101 respondents. The questionnaire, with frequencies on all variables, is contained in Appendix 1.



Source of data: Eurobarometer (EB) 69.2 and DFA/Millward Brown IMS 2008

This is very different to what has happened to average support for membership across the EU over the same period. As Figure 1 shows, average European support for EU membership experienced a sharp and sustained decline between 1991 and 1997 and has bottomed out without showing any signs of recovery in the period since then. Finally from Figure 1, one should note that the other main indicator of attitudes to EU membership (perception of benefit) confirms the existence of widespread positive orientations to EU membership among Irish people³.

Figure 2, however, provides evidence that qualifies this picture by showing that Irish enthusiasm for European integration, as measured by "feeling very sorry if the EU were scrapped" is a good deal lower than general approval of Ireland's membership.

³ Note that this question is asked intermittently and has not been asked in recent EB surveys.



Source of data: Eurobarometer (EB) 69.2 and DFA/Millward Brown IMS 2008

The positive picture of Irish attitudes to European integration has to be further qualified in the light of the relatively high level of "Irish only" identity as shown in Figure 3. The relevant Eurobarometer question asks "In the near future, do you see yourself as Irish only, Irish and European, European and Irish or European only?". In response, 45 per cent of Irish people chose the first option ("Irish only"), thereby rejecting any of the proffered European identities, including even the first step on the presumed European scale ("Irish and European"). This evidence places Ireland slightly above the European average of the proportion having an exclusive national identity and seventh in this respect behind Britain, Lithuania, Hungary, Estonia, Finland and Greece. Exclusive national identification in Britain is, not surprisingly, 10 percentage points ahead of the next most national-only country (Lithuania) and 18 percentage points ahead of Ireland.



Figure 3: Irish and other European perceptions of future identity - national only, Autumn 2005 (in descending order of national only identity)

Source of data: EB 64, QA40 - 'In the near future, do you see yourself as (NATIONALITY) only, (NATIONALITY) and European, European and (NATIONALITY) or European only?'

The final two indicators of the political culture of European integration to be used in this brief review relate to the crucial issue of knowledge. This is measured in the EB surveys as objective knowledge (assessed by a number of true/false questions) and as subjective knowledge (assessed in the Eurobarometer data shown in Figure 5 by agreement/disagreement with the statement "I understand how the European Union works"⁴). Whereas, as we have seen at the beginning of this discussion, Irish evaluative orientations to the EU are at or near the top of the EU ranking, Irish cognitive orientations – how much we know and how much we feel we know about the EU – rank below the European average. Ranking below the average on an EU knowledge scale might not make much difference were it not for the Irish requirement (political and possibly constitutional) to have a referendum on each set of amendments to the EU treaties as they arise.

⁴ The DFA survey used a more detailed question on subjective knowledge (see Table 12 below). However, the simpler EB 69 qquestion used in Figure 5 allows us to compare levels of subjective knowledge in Ireland and in the other member states.



Figure 4: Objective knowledge scale by country, Spring 2008 (in descending order of individuals who answered two or three questions correctly)

Source of data: EB 69.2, QA34 - True or false: (1) The EU currently consists of fifteen Member States; (2) Switzerland is a member of the European Union; (3) Every six months, a different Member State becomes the President of the Council of the European Union; (4) The euro area currently consists of twelve Member States



Figure 5: Subjective knowledge by country, Spring 2008 (in descending order of tend to agree with the statement 'I understand how the European Union works')

Source of data: EB 69.2, QA15a - 'Please tell me whether you tend to agree or disagree with the following statement: 'I understand how the European Union works'

The outcomes of EU referendums in Ireland and underlying voting trends

The outcomes of the seven EU referendums held in Ireland are well known. The YES side won in five of the seven and the NO side in two (the first referendum on the Nice Treaty in 2001 and the referendum on the Lisbon Treaty in 2008). Except for the two occasions on which the ratification proposals were defeated, the yes vote was in excess of sixty per cent (see tabular data at the bottom of Figure 6). However, an examination of the underlying voting patterns indicates that the various outcomes just described were based on quite different voting trends. These trends are best illustrated by graphing the results (YES, NO and abstain) as percentages of the *electorate*.



Source of data: Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government Referendum Results 1972-2008

This shows in the first place that there have been wide fluctuations in abstention – from a low of 30 per cent in the accession referendum in 1972 to a high of 66 per cent in the first Nice referendum in 2001. Even if we leave the accession referendum aside as a special case, abstention has ranged across more than 20 percentage points – from 43 per cent in the Maastricht referendum to the already noted 66 per cent in the 2001 Nice referendum. Partly as a result of these fluctuations in abstention, the YES vote as a percentage of the electorate has ranged from 58 per cent in 1972 to 16 per cent in 2001.

Figure 6 shows that the NO vote has gone through three stages. The first stage (accession and the SEA) was marked by a very low NO vote -12 and 13 per cent respectively (again note that these are as proportions of the electorate). The second stage runs from Maastricht to Nice2. At the outset of this stage the NO vote, at 18 per cent, had risen substantially, albeit from a low base. However, it then remained within a very narrow band (18 to 21 per cent) and gave the superficial appearance of being stuck on a plateau. However, the 2008 Lisbon referendum demonstrated that this vote was not static, with support for the NO side rising an impressive 10 percentage points - from 18 per cent of the electorate to 28 per cent (see Figure 6). Looking at the matter from the point of view of an Irish government, the implication of all this can be simply stated: in EU referendums in Ireland nothing can be taken for granted.

Analysis of the constituency results in the Lisbon referendum

This analysis of the constituency results will focus on two dependent variables, turnout and the NO vote. The analysis can be pursued in two ways – by examining the cartography of each variable and by statistical analysis using the constituency characteristics as recorded in the census to explain constituency-level variation in turnout and in the NO vote. The term turnout requires some specification in this context as we are not so much interested in turnout as such as in the difference in turnout between the referendum and the previous general election. We refer to this variable as voter dropoff.

Variation in election-to-referendum dropoff shows quite a distinctive pattern, being clearly higher in most of the western portion of the country and clearly lower in constituencies containing the larger urban areas (Dublin, Cork, Limerick and Galway) or areas that form the commuter hinterland to these urban centres. In seeking to account for these patterns, it should be noted that the areas of higher dropoff tend to be the areas with the highest levels of turnout in general elections. This means that in areas where the turnout is relatively low in a general election turnout tends not to fall further in referendums, whereas in areas with higher general election turnout referendum dropoff is greater. This of course partly reflects the greater scope for dropoff in areas with high turnout in general elections.



Map 1: Dropoff in turnout from 2007 General Election to Lisbon referendum

Source of data: Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government General Election Results 2007 and Lisbon Treaty Referendum Results 2008

Statistical analysis of election-to-referendum dropoff using census data confirms and sharpens the impression gained from examining the dropoff map. Two variables explain a substantial proportion of the variance in referendum dropoff. The proportion of farmers in a constituency has a clear and substantial positive effect, indicating that dropoff was higher where farmers constitute a larger proportion of the workforce. However, because we are dealing here with aggregate data, we need to proceed with caution. The finding just cited does not prove that farmers as such were more likely to abstain in the referendum (having voted in the general election); what it shows is that *aggregate areas (i.e. constituencies)* with large proportions of farmers exhibited this pattern. The same caveat applies to the second finding in Table 1, which shows that areas of Labour Party strength in the 2007 election tended to contribute to lower dropoff (note the negative sign attaching to the Labour coefficient)⁵.

	В	Std. Error	Sig.
_			
Farmers	0.436 **	0.120	0.001
Working class	0.113	0.081	0.168
Age 18-24	-0.255	0.296	0.393
Age 25-34	-0.069	0.170	0.689
Labour vote 2007	-0.229 **	0.076	0.004
Constant	13.867 **	4.777	0.006
Adjusted R ²	0.742		

Table 1: Aggregate data analysis of voter dropoff in the Lisbon Treatyreferendum, June 2008

* Indicates variable is significant at 0.1 level

** Indicates variable is significant at 0.05 level

Source of data: Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government Referendum Results 1972-2008 and Central Statistics Office Census of Population 2006

⁵ The full range of party votes was included in preliminary analyses but the Labour Party vote was the only one showing a significant effect on dropoff.

The foregoing analysis of voter dropoff should be interpreted in the context of the level of turnout in the Lisbon referendum. While, at 53 per cent, turnout was towards the upper end of the Irish European referendum spectrum (leaving 1972 aside), it was not high in any absolute sense. Turnout, therefore, remains an important issue and this analysis of voter dropoff confirms that the large swathes of voters out there who voted in the general election and not in the referendum are more likely to be found in the more rural areas and in areas with a lower Labour Party vote.

The geography of the NO vote (Map 2) shows a more complex pattern. With the exception of Galway West and Clare, the NO vote was high right along the western seaboard counties, in west Dublin, in Louth and in parts of Cork. The NO vote was lowest in south Dublin, in the Taoiseach's constituency of Laois-Offaly and in the adjacent constituency of North Kildare (the latter incidentally being the former constituency of Ireland's current EU Commissioner). That this complex pattern reflects a combination of socio-demographic and political factors is confirmed by the statistical analysis (see Table 2). This shows that the farmer variable has no effect on the NO vote one way or the other. Instead the main influence on increasing the NO vote comes from working class constituencies. Areas with higher proportions of young people also tended to vote NO, as did areas that had shown strong support for Sinn Fein in the 2007 election. However, there was a substantial counterweight to this Sinn Fein NO vote, as the analysis shows that areas with strong Fianna Fáil support in 2007 tended to vote YES in the referendum. All other potential party effects were also examined but none showed any effect, either in a pro-treaty or anti-treaty direction.



Map 2: No vote in Lisbon referendum

Source of data: Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government Referendum Lisbon Treaty Referendum Results 2008

	В	Std. Error	Sig.
Farmers	-0.218	0.184	0.244
Working class	1.101 **	0.153	0.000
Age 18-24	0.944 **	0.451	0.043
Age 25-34	-0.158	0.262	0.549
FF vote 2007	-0.243 **	0.095	0.015
SF vote 2007	0.256 **	0.124	0.047
Constant	20.112 **	7.711	0.013
Adjusted R ²	0.703		

Table 2: Aggregate data analysis of the NO vote in the Lisbon Treatyreferendum, June 2008

* Indicates variable is significant at 0.1 level

** Indicates variable is significant at 0.05 level

Source of data: Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government Referendum Results 1972-2008 and Central Statistics Office Census of Population 2006

Once again the main limitation of this analysis must be emphasised – the observations we have made apply to constituencies rather than to individuals. Accordingly we turn now to the individual-level data, beginning with the subjective accounts of reasons for abstention, for voting YES votes and for voting NO that were given by respondents in answer to a number of entirely open-ended questions asked in the DFA survey.

Spontaneous reasons and comparisons with Nice referendums

Table 3 shows the main voluntary and circumstantial reasons for abstention given by respondents in the DFA survey⁶. While the circumstantial reasons given are interesting in terms of the practical arrangements for a referendum such as its timing and the day of polling, our main interest lies in the voluntary reasons for abstention. Here the main finding is quite striking. Forty-six per cent of those who abstained in the Lisbon referendum gave some variation of lack of understanding or lack of information as their reason for not voting. Remarkably, this is identical to the proportion abstaining for this same reason in the first Nice referendum and stands in very strong contrast to the 26 per cent who have this kind of response in explaining their abstention in the second Nice referendum.

	Nice I	Nice II	Lisbon
/oluntary			
Lack of understanding/Lack of information	44	26	46
Not interested/Not bothered	20	32	16
Circumstantial			
On holiday/Away from home	15	13	19
Registration/Voting card problems	10	16	6
Too busy/Work constraints	8	9	8
Illness/Disability	4	4	3
Other	0	5	12
Ν	630	395	985

Table 3: Reasons for abstention in the Nice and Lisbon referendums

Source of data: ECR Nice I, ECR Nice II and DFA/Millward Brown IMS 2008

⁶ On the distinction between voluntary and circumstantial abstention see J. Blondel, R.Sinnott and P. Svensson, *People and Parliament in the European Union*, Oxford University Press, 1998.

This was not, however, the end of the matter. As Table 4 shows, lack of information was also given by 42 per cent of NO voters as their reason for voting NO. And, again, Lisbon was much more like Nice1 in this respect than like Nice2.

	Nice I	Nice II	Lisbon
Lack of information	39	14	42
Loss of sovereignty/independence	16	8	18
Bad idea in general	7	25	13
Anti-govt/Anti-politician		10	9
Neutrality and military issues	12	17	8
Negative reaction to perceived pressure to vote YES			8
Influence of political party, politician, TV debate	6	5	5
Loss of Irish Commissioner on rotating basis			4
Loss of control over taxation			3
Abortion issue	1	1	2
Would create refugee problems/immigration	3	11	1
Advice of family/friends	1	2	1
Other/Don't know	15	21	13
Ν	300	223	597

Table 4: Reasons for voting NO in the Nice and Lisbon referendums

Source of data: ECR Nice I, ECR Nice II and DFA/Millward Brown IMS 2008

While there is lots of further food for thought in the various responses given in Tables 3 and 4, the overriding finding is the impact of knowledge on behaviour – both on abstention and on voting NO. Of course these responses are only subjective accounts of what people see as the reasons for their behaviour and as such they need to be verified by more objective data and by statistical analysis. We shall turn to that task presently. In the meantime we simply note that knowledge appears to have had quite an impact on behaviour in the Lisbon referendum (as it had on behaviour in the first Nice referendum).

Bivariate analyses of YES/NO vote

In order to move beyond the subjective accounts given by respondents in the survey, we need to look at the relationship between behaviour in the referendum and the fundamental socio-demographic and attitudinal characteristics of the respondents. This can be done initially by looking at how the behaviour in question (the "dependent variable") varies across the categories of the "independent variable". So for example, we look at behaviour (vote YES/vote NO) across the age spectrum to see if there are any differences and, therefore, any evidence of a potential relationship between the variables. It must be emphasised that these are bivariate relationships and that reality is much more complicated because any putative relationship may simply reflect the fact that some third variable is the real cause and the apparent relationship is therefore spurious. For example, if we find (as we do) that vote in the referendum is related to social class, we have to bear in mind that educational level may directly affect both social class and vote choice and that this may be the real reason for the connection between class and vote. The problem is that there are many factors that may give rise to spurious bivariate relationships. Multivariate analysis is needed in order to tackle this problem (see below). In the meantime it is still important to examine the bivariate relationships, but bearing the caveat just outlined in mind.

	Professional and managerial (AB)	Lower middle class (C1)	Skilled working class (C2)	Unskilled working class (DE)	Farming (F)
Voted Yes	64	52	37	35	52
Voted No	36	48	63	65	48
N	178	313	250	256	121

Table 5: Vote by occupational class

As it turns out, at this bivariate level, voting YES/voting NO is not strongly related to age or to gender (see Tables 6 and 7). On the other hand, the YES/NO vote is clearly related to social class (see Table 5), a finding that confirms the constituency-level analysis and is all the more striking in a society in which electoral politics is not strongly class-related. Be that as it may, in this case the contrast between the voting choice of the AB occupational group and that of those in working class occupations is very strong – 64 per cent of the former voted YES compared to 36 per cent of the latter. As just discussed, however, this is a good example of a bivariate relationship that needs to be probed further to see if it is "really" class that is related to vote choice or if that relationship can be explained by other factors.

	Male	Female
Voted Yes Voted No	49 51	44 56
N	556	560

Table 6: Vote by gender

Source of data: DFA/Millward Brown IMS 2008

Table 7: Vote by age

	18-24	25-34	35-49	50-64	65+
Voted Yes Voted No	45 55	41 59	48 52	47 53	49 51
N	107	193	326	293	206

The next set of tables (Tables 8, 9 and 10) shows the relationship between vote and a set of attitudes that might be expected to have played a role in deciding people's vote, i.e. attitudes to identity, neutrality and immigration. Each of these variables shows a strong relationship to vote choice. Thus, 67 per cent of those who see themselves in the near future as "Irish only" voted NO, compared to a NO vote of only 44 per cent who said they see themselves in the near future as "Irish and European". The range of difference in voting behaviour is greater for the other two attitudes considered here – from a 77 per cent NO vote among those at the extreme pro-neutrality end of the spectrum to 32 per cent NO among those at the opposite extreme. Attitudes to immigration show a similarly strong bivariate relationship, with a NO vote of approximately 80 per cent among those who feel strongly negative about immigration compared to a NO vote of approximately 35 per cent among those with very positive views about immigration. While the foregoing relationships (and the ones to be considered below) are substantial, they are strictly bivariate and multivariate analysis will be required to tease out their relative effects on the decision to vote YES/NO.

	lrish only	Irish and European	European and Irish or European only	Don't Know
Voted Yes	32	55	57	46
Voted No	67	44	43	54
N	462	583	49	22

Table 8: Vote by attitudes toward future identity

Table 9: Vote by	attitudes to neutrality
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	1 Ireland should do everything it can to strengthen its neutrality	2	3	4	5	6	7	N li	9 Ireland hould be willing to accept mitations on its neutrality	No opinion/ Don't know
Voted Yes	23	40	48	44	52	53	59	61	68	36
Voted No	77	60	52	56	48	47	41	39	32	65
N	175	100	128	82	151	148	131	72	53	76

Source of data: DFA/Millward Brown IMS 2008

	10 Better place to live	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1 Worse place to live
Voted Yes	59	70	68	55	53	46	34	29	15	22
Voted No	41	30	32	45	47	54	66	71	85	78
N	85	61	126	123	139	211	105	104	47	92

Table 10: Vote by attitudes to immigration

Given the prominence of the themes of information and knowledge in people's accounts of their behaviour, it is essential to examine the bivariate evidence to see if knowledge is indeed related to vote choice. In this context, knowledge can be measured objectively (by a test) or subjectively (by asking people about their sense of knowing or not knowing what something is all about). Both of these measures of knowledge can be applied at the European level and at the national level, yielding the four measures of knowledge shown in Tables 11 to 14.

	All correct	Three correct	Two correct	One correct	No correct
	answers	answers	answers	answer	answers
Voted Yes	63	51	37	39	28
Voted No	37	49	63	61	72
N	303	279	265	147	122

Table 11: Vote by objective knowledge of the EU

Source of data: DFA/Millward Brown IMS 2008

Objective knowledge of the EU (measured by an adaptation of four Eurobarometer questions) certainly shows a strong relationship to YES/NO vote choice. The NO vote is 72 per cent among those with no correct answers and falls to 37 per cent among those who answer the four questions correctly (see Table 11). Also in the case of European subjective knowledge, voting NO increases by about 30 percentage points as one moves down the subjective knowledge scale from close to the "know a great deal" end towards the "know nothing at all" end (see Table 12).

	10 and 9 Know a great deal	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1 Nothing at all
Voted Yes	66	61	54	58	46	38	34	29	35
Voted No	34	39	46	42	54	62	66	71	65
N	32	93	144	168	276	167	113	63	55

Table 12: Vote by level of subjective knowledge of the EU

Source of data: DFA/Millward Brown IMS 2008

Objective knowledge of the Lisbon Treaty was measured by a series of items about provisions that were contained in or were perceived to be contained in the Lisbon Treaty. Using 9 of the 11 times in Q19 (see Appendix 1) yields a 10 point scale of knowledge of the contents of the treaty⁷. Crosstabulating YES/NO vote by this scale shows a NO vote of the order of 75 percent among those with no or only one correct response, compared to a NO vote of about 20 per cent among those correctly identifying 8 or 9 items in the treaty (Table 13).

	All correct answers	Eight correct answers	Seven correct answers	Six correct answers	Five correct answers	Four correct answers	Three correct answers	Two correct answers	One correct answer	No correct answers
Voted Yes	84	80	74	48	48	36	29	27	19	26
Voted No	16	20	26	52	52	64	71	73	81	74
N	19	100	113	267	158	148	128	86	32	65

⁷ In order to obtain a scale that would be as clear-cut as possible, items in Q19 referring to the erosion of Irish neutrality and to the protection of workers' rights were not included in the scale.

Finally we have a subjective measure of knowledge of the Lisbon Treaty (see Table 14). This is a four-point scale ranging from "I had a good understanding of what the Treaty was all about" to "I did not know what the treaty was about at all". Seventy-seven per cent of people in the latter category voted NO compared to a 40 per cent NO vote among those who felt they had a good understanding of the matter.

	Good understanding of what the Treaty was about	l understood some of the issues but not all that was involved	l was only vaguely aware of the issues involved	l did not know what the Treaty was about at all
Voted Yes	60	55	37	23
Voted No	40	44	63	77
N	153	490	323	145

Table 14: Vote by subjective knowledge of the issues involved in the Lisbon Treaty

Source of data: DFA/Millward Brown IMS 2008

In summary, whether measured in relation to the EU or in regard to the Lisbon Treaty and whether measured by an objective test or by subjective assessment (by the respondent), knowledge shows a strong relationship to vote choice in the 2008 referendum on the Lisbon Treaty. This is consistent with the voters' own accounts of their behaviour and of the reasons for it as described in Table 4 above. Putting all this evidence together underlines the need to look closely at the role of knowledge in the multivariate analysis to be undertaken below.

There is one further explanation of the referendum outcome that is worth exploring at the bivariate level. This is the role that domestic politics may have played in all this and specifically the commonly expressed view that dissatisfaction with the incumbent government played a major role in producing a NO vote. Table 15 shows a substantial bivariate relationship between satisfaction/dissatisfaction with the government and YES/NO vote. The NO vote ranges from 72 per cent among the very dissatisfied to 40 per cent among the quite satisfied and down to 25 per cent among the very satisfied. The extent to which this relationship stands up in a multivariate analysis will be investigated below.

	Very	Quite	Quite	Very
	satisfied	satisfied	dissatisfied	dissatisfied
Voted Yes	75	60	34	28
Voted No	25	40	66	72
N	67	470	343	211

Table 15: Vote by satisfaction with government

Source of data: DFA/Millward Brown IMS 2008

Before proceeding to this, the relationship between government satisfaction and EU referendum outcomes in Ireland 1998-2008 is illustrated in Figure 7. This shows (a) satisfaction with government from 1997 to 2008 and (b) the percentage YES vote in the four EU referendums held during the period indicated. Each of the four referendums presents a different picture. In the Amsterdam Treaty referendum, satisfaction was high and the YES vote was high. In Nice1 satisfaction was still pretty high but the YES vote was way down (to 46 per cent of the valid vote and 16 per cent of the electorate). In Nice2, satisfaction with the government had plummeted just before the referendum (and remained down for months afterwards) yet the YES side won (with 63 per cent of the valid vote and 31 per cent of the electorate). In the Lisbon case satisfaction with government and the YES vote in the referendum were both down. In summary and acknowledging that we are looking at only four cases, we can say that two of the cases - Amsterdam and Lisbon - are compatible (no more than that) with the view that satisfaction with government is the overriding factor and two - Nice1 and Nice2 - are incompatible with that view. Clearly government satisfaction is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for winning a referendum on EU issues in Ireland. This again points to the need to undertake a multivariate analysis of the determinants of vote choice in the Lisbon referendum.



Figure 7: Government satisfaction and EU referendum YES votes

Main determinants of YES/NO vote choice

We begin this multivariate analysis by examining the standard socio-demographic effects, namely gender, age and, particularly in the light of the constituency-level analysis and the individual-level bivariate findings, social class. The first number in each cell of Table 16 shows the estimated effect of the variable in question on the propensity to vote NO, taking into account the effects of all the other variables in the model. Each column of numbers represents a model, with variables being added to (or removed from) the models as one moves across the table from left to right. Each cell also gives the standard error of the estimate (in italics). Asterisks identify estimates that are statistically significant at the 0.05 and 0.1 cut-off points. Thus one would immediately conclude that gender as such had no effect on propensity to vote YES or NO. It is clear, however, that age has a particular impact in that respondents aged between 25 and 34 were significantly more likely to vote NO. As explained in the notes to Table 16, the effect of each of the age categories is relative to a "reference category", which is, in this case, being aged 65 or over.

Source of data: TNS mrbi and Millward Brown IMS Opinion Polls, and Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government Referendum Results

Demographics	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Female	0.16 (0.11)	0.17 (0.11)	0.17 (0.13)	0.15 (0.14)	0.07 (0.15)	0.01 (0.16)	0.04 (0.16)
Age 18-24	0.42 * (0.24)	0.49 ** (0.25)	0.37 (0.28)	0.22 (0.30)	0.38 (0.34)	0.56 * (0.34)	0.54 (0.34)
Age 25-34	0.54 ** (0.20)	0.67 ** (0.21)	0.64 ** (0.23)	0.57 ** (0.26)	0.56 ** (0.28)	0.64 ** (0.29)	0.61 * (0.29)
Age 35-49	0.26 (0.18)	0.35 * (0.19)	0.24 (0.21)	0.23 (0.23)	0.30 (0.26)	0.38 (0.26)	0.38 (0.26)
Age 50-64	0.21 (0.18)	0.25 (0.19)	0.23 (0.21)	0.21 (0.23)	0.22 (0.26)	0.27 (0.26)	0.31 (0.26)
Lower middle class	0.40 ** (0.18)	0.33 * (0.18)	0.24 (0.20)	0.21 (0.22)	0.19 (0.24)	0.18 (0.24)	0.22 (0.24)
Skilled working class	1.09 ** (0.19)	0.92 ** (0.20)	0.78 ** (0.22)	0.67 ** (0.24)	0.60 ** (0.27)	0.66 ** (0.27)	0.71 * (0.28)
Unskilled working class	1.18 ** (0.20)	1.00 ** (0.21)	0.85 ** (0.24)	0.76 ** (0.26)	0.49 * (0.29)	0.55 * (0.30)	0.64 * (0.30)
Large farmer	0.15 (0.26)	-0.02 (0.28)	-0.22 (0.30)	-0.17 (0.34)	-0.44 (0.40)	-0.45 (0.40)	-0.29 (0.39)
Small farmer	0.88 ** (0.43)	0.66 (0.45)	0.75 (0.50)	0.91 * (0.55)	0.66 (0.63)	0.71 (0.65)	0.65 (0.66)
Secondary education	-	-0.11 (0.23)	-0.14 (0.25)	0.13 (0.28)	0.21 (0.32)	0.22 (0.33)	0.19 (0.34)
Third level education		-0.41 (0.26)	-0.42 (0.28)	-0.12 (0.31)	0.02 (0.36)	0.05 (0.37)	0.03 (0.38)
Domestic politics	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Dissatisfaction with economy			0.83 ** (0.17)	0.71 ** (0.19)	0.49 ** (0.21)	0.36 * (0.21)	0.39 * (0.21)
Dissatisfaction with the government			0.82 ** (0.13)	0.81 ** (0.15)	0.69 ** (0.16)	0.75 ** (0.17)	0.79 * (0.17)
Close to opposition party			0.77 ** (0.13)	0.87 ** (0.14)	0.91 ** (0.16)	1.02 ** (0.17)	1.04 * (0.17)
Perceptions of Treaty							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	1	2	3	4 0.53 ** (0.18)			7
End control of abortion policy in Treaty	1	2	3	0.53 **	5 0.38 *		7
	1	2	3	0.53 ** <i>(0.18)</i> -0.12	5 0.38 * (0.20) 0.03		7
End control of abortion policy in Treaty Rotating loss of commissioner in Treaty	1	2	3	0.53 ** (0.18) -0.12 (0.18) 0.55 ** (0.17) 0.31 **	5 0.38 * (0.20) 0.03 (0.20) 0.48 **		7
End control of abortion policy in Treaty Rotating loss of commissioner in Treaty Conscription in Treaty	1	2	3	0.53 ** (0.18) -0.12 (0.18) 0.55 ** (0.17) 0.31 ** (0.16) -0.47 **	5 0.38 * (0.20) 0.03 (0.20) 0.48 ** (0.19) 0.13 (0.17) -0.39 **		7
End control of abortion policy in Treaty Rotating loss of commissioner in Treaty Conscription in Treaty End control of corporate tax rate in Treaty	1	2	3	0.53 ** (0.18) -0.12 (0.18) 0.55 ** (0.17) 0.31 ** (0.16) -0.47 ** (0.17) 0.72 **	5 0.38 * (0.20) 0.03 (0.20) 0.48 ** (0.19) 0.13 (0.17) -0.39 ** (0.19) 0.62 **		7
End control of abortion policy in Treaty Rotating loss of commissioner in Treaty Conscription in Treaty End control of corporate tax rate in Treaty Improved EU efficiency in Treaty	1	2	3	0.53 ** (0.18) -0.12 (0.18) 0.55 ** (0.17) 0.31 ** (0.16) -0.47 ** (0.17) 0.72 ** (0.17) -0.47 **	5 0.38 * (0.20) 0.03 (0.20) 0.48 ** (0.19) 0.13 (0.17) -0.39 ** (0.19) 0.62 ** (0.18) -0.49 **		7
End control of abortion policy in Treaty Rotating loss of commissioner in Treaty Conscription in Treaty End control of corporate tax rate in Treaty Improved EU efficiency in Treaty Erosion of neutrality in Treaty	1	2	3	0.53 ** (0.18) -0.12 (0.18) 0.55 ** (0.17) 0.31 ** (0.16) -0.47 ** (0.17) 0.72 ** (0.17)	5 0.38 * (0.20) 0.03 (0.20) 0.48 ** (0.19) 0.13 (0.17) -0.39 ** (0.19) 0.62 ** (0.18)		7

Table 16: Multivariate regression models explaining the probability of a respondent voting NO to the Lisbon Treaty

Reduction of voting power in Treaty				0.03 (0.15)	0.08 (0.17)		
Improved workers' rights in Treaty				-0.39 ** (0.16)	-0.29 <i>(0.18)</i>		
Attitudes to integration	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Irish only identity					0.44 ** (0.17)	0.35 ** (0.17)	0.37 ** (0.17)
EU membership a good thing					-1.18 ** <i>(0.24)</i>	-1.23 ** <i>(0.25)</i>	-1.18 ** <i>(0.25)</i>
Strengthen neutrality					0.71 ** <i>(0.15)</i>	0.72 ** (0.16)	0.69 ** (0.16)
Too many issues decided by EU					0.53 ** (0.17)	0.65 ** (0.17)	0.63 ** (0.17)
EU means lower wage rates					0.91 ** <i>(0.35)</i>	1.11 ** <i>(0.34)</i>	1.05 ** <i>(0.35)</i>
Anti-immigration sentiment					0.32 * (0.18)	0.34 * (0.18)	0.32 * (0.19)
Each state a Commissioner important					0.39 ** (0.16)	0.47 ** (0.18)	0.47 ** (0.18)
Control over abortion law important					-0.11 (0.19)	-0.15 <i>(0.19)</i>	-0.26 (0.19)
Protection of workers' rights important					0.16 (0.18)	0.16 (0.18)	0.19 <i>(0.18)</i>
Knowledge	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Low objective knowledge of the EU						0.34 ** (0.17)	0.35 ** (0.17)
Low objective knowledge of the Treaty						1.21 ** (0.20)	
Inaccurately perceived to be in Treaty							1.06 ** (0.17)
Accurately perceived to be in Treaty							-0.94 ** (0.20)
Number of observations	1354	1354	1301	1301	1203	1096	1096
Correctly predicted (threshold: 0.75)	0.44	0.44	0.59	0.67	0.71	0.70	0.70

Standard errors are in brackets.

* significant at p=/<0.10; ** significant at p=/<0.05

Notes:

1) The social class categories are all relative to the upper middle class category;

2) The education categories are all relative to those with only primary level education;

3) The dissatisfaction with the government variable reports those who are (very) dissatisfied relative to those who are either neutral or satisfied;

4) The dissatisfaction with the economy variable reports those who consider their own economic situation to be very or fairly bad, relative to those who are neutral or consider their economic situation to be good;

5) Objective knowledge of the EU is a five point scale based on question 8;

6) Objective knowledge of the treaty is a ten point scale based on question 19;

7) The Irish identity variable reports those who identify as Irish only, relative to those who also or solely report a European identity;

8) The importance variables concerns those who report an issue to be very important, relative to those who consider it only moderately important, are neutral, or consider it not important;

9) The age variable is relative to those who are 65+;

10) These are logistic regression models with the independent variables standardised, including all respondents who reported to have voted in the referendum and with list-wise deletion of missing values.

Both the constituency-level analysis and the bivariate crosstabulations indicate a strong correlation between social class and how a person voted in the Lisbon referendum. Distinguishing between the standard occupational categories of professional and managerial (AB), lower middle class (C1), skilled working class (C2), unskilled working class (DE) and, within the farmer group, between large farmers (50 acres+) and small farmers (<50 acres), the evidence in Table 16 shows (i) that there is a modest difference (in the direction of voting NO) between the lower middle class in comparison with the reference category of the managerial and professional class (an estimated coefficient of 0.40); (ii) there is a much more substantial difference, again in the direction of voting NO, between the skilled working class and the AB group (a coefficient of 1.09) and (iii) there is an equally big difference between unskilled workers and the managerial and professional social class (estimated coefficient 1.18). The numbers also show, however, that (iv) there is no difference between the propensity of large farmers to vote NO by comparison with the reference category (the AB group), while there is a substantial difference in propensity to vote NO among small farmers in comparison to the AB group (a coefficient of 0.88).

The question is whether this apparently strong relationship between social class and YES/NO vote are really about class or whether it is a function of education or of some other variable. To begin testing this possibility, Table 16 introduces education into the analysis (model 2). Doing so accounts for some of the occupational class effect. Specifically, the difference between the lower middle class effect and the professional managerial effect is no longer distinguishable from random differences. The same goes for the small farmer effect. The implication is that, for both those in lower middle class occupations and for small farmers, their level of education is very closely related to their social class and the effect of either of these variables is too weak to be to be distinguishable as statistically significant effects. Note also that in this model education does not have a significant effect itself – a point that we examine further below. In the meantime we can conclude that the main social class effects (the increased propensity of the skilled and unskilled working class to vote NO) are not reducible to the impact of lower levels of education.

Even taking account of the macro-level evidence regarding the varying relationships between satisfaction with government and voting in EU-related referendums presented in Figure 7 above, the multivariate analysis must address the possibility that the NO vote was largely a vote against the government. In this view a referendum is a sort of plebiscite on government performance. Such an interpretation is frequently put forward in the research literature on referendums and is usually referred to as the "second-order-election" interpretation of referendums, i.e. referendums are surrogate elections. A variation on this interpretation would suggest that anxiety regarding the economic situation may also have contributed to the NO vote.

Model 3 examines these possibilities by including government dissatisfaction and negative assessments of the economic situation in the model. However in this context, one must also take account of the possibility that some supporters of the opposition parties may have both voted NO and have expressed dissatisfaction with the government primarily because of loyalty to their party-in-opposition. If they were to have behaved in this way, the real cause of their NO vote would be their party loyalty rather than their satisfaction/dissatisfaction with the government. In order to control for this potentially confounding effect, we have included a measure of opposition-party affiliation or attachment in Model 3 (see Q31 in Appendix 1). The results indicate that all three variables (dissatisfaction with the government, a negative view of one's own economic situation and feeling close to a party in opposition) played more or less equal roles in increasing the NO vote.

Is this it then? Was the referendum "really" about a combination of a class cleavage and domestic politics? In order to answer this question, the model needs to include people's perceptions of and attitudes to the EU and the Lisbon Treaty. We start by inserting in the model the eleven individual items measuring perceptions of the contents of the treaty (Model 4). The results show that the perceptions that the end of Ireland's control over its policy on abortion, the introduction of conscription, the ending of Irish control over Irish corporate tax rate and the erosion of Irish neutrality were in the treaty contributed to the NO vote and that the perceptions that improved efficiency of EU decision-making, a stronger role for national parliaments, the charter of fundamental rights, a stronger role for the EU in the world and the protection of workers' right were in the treaty contributed to the YES vote. On the other hand, the perceptions that periodic loss of an Irish commissionership and the changes in Ireland's voting power in the Council of Ministers were in the treaty appear to have had no effect on voting YES or NO. These latter two findings may seem surprising as each, and especially the rotating commissionership, represents a potential diminution of Ireland's influence in EU policy-making. The explanation is not that people do not care about these matters; the survey evidence documents clearly that they do care and, as we shall see in a moment, their view of the importance of retaining a permanent presence in the Commission affected their vote (see discussion of Model 5 following this paragraph). The explanation of the findings regarding the rotating commissionership and majority voting being seen to be in the Treaty is that many people who correctly perceived the changes to the commissionership and to voting in the Council as being provided for in the treaty still voted YES – on the grounds that the losses involved were outweighed by the gains that would flow from ratification. Other people, with exactly the same perception that these two aspects were in the treaty, voted NO. Accordingly, it is entirely predictable that there would be no relationship between perceiving these matters to be in the treaty and whether one voted YES or NO.

The impact of the *perceived importance* of retaining the full commissionership is an entirely different matter. Eighty per cent of Irish people believe that the commissionership is an important issue for Ireland within the EU; 65 per cent said it was an important issue in making up their minds how to vote and 17 per cent put it at the very top of their agenda of issues of importance to Ireland in the EU. Multivariate analysis controlling for a wide range of variables (see model 5 in Table 16) showed that the belief that it is important for Ireland to maintain a permanent presence in the Commission was a statistically significant and substantial consideration inclining people to vote NO.

Model 5 also inserts a number of measures of basic attitudes to integration into the model. The variables are: Irish/European identity, Irish EU membership good, pro Irish neutrality, the view that too many issues are decided by the EU, antiimmigration attitude and the perception that the EU "means low wage rates"). All six variables have statistically significant effects. The belief that Irish membership is a good thing has the strongest of the five effects (see the coefficient of -1.18 in Model 5). This is an important finding in that it shows that the widespread positive attitude to Ireland's membership of the EU did in fact carry over into behaviour in support of the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. With a lower but still substantial impact, the belief that the EU means lower wage rates, self-identification as Irish-only, commitment to strengthening neutrality, belief that there is too much EU decision-making and negative attitudes to immigration all contributed to the NO vote. Note also that once these variables are included in the model, belief in the importance of Ireland retaining full control over its abortion law and belief in the importance of improving the protection of workers' rights had no effect on voting one way or the other.

Inclusion of the foregoing attitudes in the model has the additional effect of making a number of the perceptions of the content of the Treaty statistically insignificant (compare models 4 and 5). This means that, when controlled for the effects of the broad attitudes entered in the model, the particular perceptions of what was in the treaty that continue to have an influence are those relating to conscription (negative), neutrality (negative) and strengthening the role of national parliaments (positive).

This brings us squarely back to the issue of knowledge and perceptions and their impact on the vote outcome. We referred above to the potential use of nine of the eleven items in Q19 to form an index of knowledge and we presented such an index in Table 13. In constructing this index we coded the 9 items as correct or incorrect and summed the score of each respondent across all 9 items. Model 6 adds this variable to the analysis while at the same time removing the individual Q19 items to avoid including the same items more than once. This analysis shows that the impact of overall knowledge of the treaty is very substantial (a coefficient of 1.21 with a standard error of 0.20).

This finding regarding the impact of knowledge is very important as it confirms a major aspect of the results of the open-ended question on reasons for voting NO, namely the extent to which, in response to a totally open-ended question, respondents spontaneously gave lack of understanding or lack of knowledge as their reason for voting NO. The impact of our knowledge index on the vote provides strong evidence that the spontaneous accounts given by respondents in the survey were not random

thoughts "off the top of the head" but were important indications of what was really driving voting decisions.

In a final probe into the role played by knowledge of the contents of the treaty we carried out a factor analysis of the nine items that form our index of knowledge. The advantage of factor analysis is that it indicates the extent and nature of any latent dimensions underlying a series of items such as those contained in Q19. The dimensions are called factors and the interpretation of the factors depends on the size of the factor loadings and the degree of overlap of the loadings on different factors. The results in this case point very clearly to two distinct underlying dimensions. The first dimension has high loadings on all six of the items that were indeed included in the Lisbon Treaty (see Table 17). This dimension can be labelled "accurately perceived to be in treaty". The second dimension clearly identifies a factor defined by a subset of three items that measure misperceptions or incorrect information. We can give this factor the label "inaccurately perceived to be in treaty".

In the light of these results we can calculate scores for each of the two factors and include the resulting two new variables in the analysis. This is done in Model 7 in Table 16. The results throw important new light on the role of knowledge and information in determining how people voted. It is true that knowledge as a whole had a major impact on voting YES or NO. The more one knew the more likely it was that one would vote YES (see model 6). However, the present more detailed statistical analysis of the data shows that there were two dimensions of knowledge at work. The first was the degree to which a person perceived provisions in the treaty that were actually in the treaty. The second dimension was the extent to which people perceived things to be in the treaty that were NOT there, namely the introduction of conscription to a European army, the end of Ireland's control over its rate of corporate tax and the end of Irish control over its policy on abortion.
Table 17: Factor analysis of items perceived to be in the Lisbon Treaty

	Accurately perceived to be in Lisbon Treaty	Inaccurately perceived to be in Lisbon Treaty
Strengthening role of national parliaments in EU decision-making	0.72	0.01
Strengthening Europe's role in the world	0.72	0.23
Increased efficiency of EU decision-making	0.71	0.19
Charter of Fundamental Rights	0.68	0.04
Loss of Irish Commissioner for 5 out of every 15 years	0.62	0.20
Reduction of Ireland's voting strength in the Council of Ministers	0.61	-0.11
Introduction of conscription to a European army	0.11	0.81
End of Ireland's control over its policy on abortion	0.12	0.79
End of Ireland's right to decide its own corporate tax rate	0.03	0.73
Percent variance explained	34.45	18.13

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

Source of data: DFA/Millward Brown IMS 2008

These two sets of perceptions of the contents of the treaty had opposite effects on vote choice, a high score on the correct perception set leading to a YES vote and a high score on the incorrect perception set leading to a NO vote. The latter finding strongly suggests that the failure to convince or reassure people that the issues of corporate taxation, of abortion and of conscription were not in the Lisbon Treaty played a substantial role in the defeat of the ratification proposal.

Figure 8 provides a graphical guide to the findings in Model 7 (the rightmost column in Table 16). The dots in this plot are the estimated coefficients of the regression - higher values represent stronger effects. The dots are arranged from right to left in descending order of the size of the coefficients (indicating the size of the impact of the variable in question on voting YES or NO). Black dots indicate positive effects on the NO vote (i.e. tending to increase the NO vote). White circles indicate negative effects (reducing the NO vote and of course by implication increasing the YES vote). The horizontal lines represent confidence intervals - roughly speaking, we are 95 per

cent sure that the true coefficient is located within this range. If this line does not cross the vertical dotted line, which is located at zero on the horizontal scale, we can be 95 per cent sure that the true coefficient is significantly different from zero. Coefficients with lines that barely cross the zero line are thus almost significant; coefficients with lines that clearly cross the zero line are clearly statistically insignificant.

Figure 8: Absolute values of coefficients explaining the NO vote



Note: All variables are dummy variables, except for the objective knowledge of the treaty variables and attitude towards immigration, which are standardized scales of ten point scales. Open circles represent negative coefficients; the lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Lines that cross the dotted vertical line correspond to statistically insignificant coefficients at the 95% significance level. Age variables are relative to the 65+ age group; class variables are relative to the upper middle class; education is relative to primary education only.

Source of data: DFA/Millward Brown IMS 2008

Most of the findings shown in Figure 8 have already been noted in the discussion of Table 16. The graphical presentation is designed to highlight the most important findings. These include the strong negative impact on the NO vote of the belief that Irish membership of the EU is a good thing and the strong positive effect on the NO vote (i.e. tending to increase the NO vote) of *inaccurate* perceptions of what was included in the treaty (abortion, conscription and corporate taxation). On the other

hand, accurate perception of some of the main provisions of the treaty tended to reduce the NO vote. The graphical presentation also highlights the substantial impact on the NO vote of the perception that the EU means low wage rates.

Figure 8 also shows up the role of domestic politics. This involves a tendency to vote NO among those who feel close to an opposition party or who are dissatisfied with government or, to a lesser extent, who are unhappy with their own economic situation. Figure 8 also points to the important role in determining the voters' decisions that was played by policy or policy-making concerns, including neutrality, the belief that the scope of EU decision-making is too wide and the belief in the importance of Ireland retaining a permanent presence in the European Commission.

The role of economic interests

In this section we look specifically at the role of economic interests in determining vote choice in the referendum. Economic interests are measured by six items – the standard categorization of social class; education; the belief that "EU means low wage rates"; anti-immigration sentiment; the perception that one's "own economic situation is fairly/very bad" and a belief in the importance of improved protection of workers' rights. Age, gender and knowledge of the EU and of the Lisbon Treaty are included as control variables and are measured as in the preceding sections of this report.

As well as dealing with a reduced set of variables, this analysis differs from that in Table 16 in that it focuses on the differences in the effects of the independent variables as between those who are actively involved in the labour force and those who are not. We do this because, for some variables, the effect on the no vote differs significantly between the two groups. The first two columns in the table present the coefficients for those in the labour force and for those who are not in the labour force. The third column presents the difference between the two effects and shows the statistical significance of this difference. Thus the third column identifies those variables that have a different impact on the probability of voting NO depending on whether we are looking at people who are in the labour force or at people who are not in the belief

that EU means low wage rates has different effects for labour-force and non-labourforce participants. Among participants in the labour force, the low-wage image of the EU contributes substantially to an increase in the NO vote but makes no difference among people not in the labour force. The reason is obvious - wages directly affect those in the labour force and affect only indirectly, if at all, those not in the labour force. The other differential effects are more subtle and more revealing and in fact solve two puzzling aspect of the findings in Table 16. The first puzzle is the apparently negligible impact of farming occupation on vote choice in the referendum (see Table 16). This puzzle is solved by the analysis in Table 18, which shows that large farmers did indeed strongly support the treaty – but only if they were active in the labour force. Retired farmers and spouses of farmers who would be classified as farmers in the occupational scale but who would not be in the labour force showed no particular propensity to vote YES or NO, one way or the other. The second puzzle also relates to the absence of an expected effect - education. Again the reader will have noticed from Table 16 that neither second nor third-level education had any apparent effect on vote choice in the referendum. This would be, to say the least, surprising. Table 18 solves the puzzle by showing that the effects of both second and third-level education are quite different for labour force and non-labour force participants, with the combination of third-level education and labour force participation having a particularly strong negative effect on the NO vote.

Most of the other findings in Table 18 confirm what we already know from the more detailed analysis presented in Table 16. The one notable exception is the impact of the belief in the importance of improved protection of workers' rights. Table 18 shows that, in the context of and controlling for a limited number of mainly socio-economic variables, belief in the need for improved protection of workers' rights did lead to an increase in the NO vote and that this effect obtained in situations of both labour force and non-labour force participation. It should also be noted that, as with the results of the general model (model 7 in Table 16), occupational class effects tend to persist. Thus, in comparison to the upper middle class, the unskilled working class are more likely to vote NO. Note, however, that, in this model, the skilled working class effect (relative to the AB group) is found only among non-labour-force participants.

	Labour	Non-labour	Difference between labour
	force	force	and non-labour force
Age ^a 18-24	-0.26	0.17	-0.43
	(0.58)	(0.45)	(0.73)
Age 25-34	-0.05	-0.17	0.12
	(0.52)	<i>(0.49)</i>	(0.71)
Age 35-49	-0.40	-0.12	-0.27
	(0.50)	(0.39)	(0.64)
Age 50-64	-0.42	-0.08	-0.35
	(0.50)	(0.33)	(0.60)
Female ^b	0.08	0.26	-0.19
	(0.18)	(0.28)	<i>(0.34)</i>
Lower middle class ^c	0.17	0.49	-0.32
	(0.25)	(0.45)	(0.51)
Skilled working class	0.36	1.10	** -0.74
	(0.30)	<i>(0.49)</i>	(0.57)
Unskilled working class	0.67 *	0.77	* -0.10
	(0.36)	(0.45)	(0.58)
Large farmer	-0.98 **	0.27	-1.25 *
	(0.44)	(0.62)	(0.76)
Small farmer	0.46	0.14	0.32
	(0.39)	(0.88)	(1.15)
Secondary education ^d	-0.71	0.46	-1.17 *
	(0.53)	(0.39)	(0.66)
Third level education	-1.04 *	0.76	-1.80 **
	(0.56)	(0.50)	(0.75)
Anti-immigration sentiment	0.69 **	0.90	** -0.21
	(0.21)	(0.27)	(0.34)
EU means lower wages	1.82 **	0.02	1.80 **
	(0.53)	(0.50)	(0.73)
Own economic situation bad	0.91 **	1.29	** -0.38
	(0.24)	(0.33)	(0.41)
Low objective knowledge of the Treaty	1.71 **	1.09	** 0.61
	(0.25)	(0.32)	(0.40)
Low objective knowledge of the EU	0.37 *	0.33	0.04
	(0.19)	(0.27)	(0.33)
Norkers' rights important	0.39 **	0.45	* -0.06
	(0.18)	(0.25)	(0.30)
Constant	1.16 *	-1.32	** 2.48 **
	(0.70)	(0.57)	(0.90)

 Table 18: Determinants of the NO vote in the Lisbon Treaty referendum - socio-economic aspects and labour force participation

This table is based on a logistic regression with standardised independent variables.

All the coefficients are based on the same interactive model.

Standard errors are in brackets.

* significant at p=/<0.10; ** significant at p=/<0.05

^a Age coefficients show the difference relative to the 65+ group.

^b The coefficient shows the difference between males and females.

^c Social class coefficients show the difference relative to the upper middle class.

^d Education coefficients show the difference relative to the group with only primary education.

Source of data: DFA/Millward Brown IMS 2008

In sum, this analysis highlights the differential effect of a number of socio-economic variables on the probability of voting NO. The variables are the belief that the EU means low wages, the occupational status of being a large farmer and level of education. The fact that these effects are conditional on participation in the labour suggests that we should think of them as operating through labour market channels and as demonstrating the impact of economic interests on voting decisions. In addition, there is widespread international evidence that immigration may affect respondents' economic interests via their roles as taxpayers and recipients of government services. For both of these reasons, it is not surprising to see that attitudes to immigration do not just influence the propensity to vote NO of labour market participants. The fact that the education effect only works for those in the labour force is particularly noteworthy, as it suggests that it is not so much education per se that matters, but rather education as it relates to people's experience in the labour market. In the light of this we believe that education is acting here as a proxy for skill levels, as it has been shown to do in many international studies, and that, the higher the skill level, the less likely is it that the person involved will have voted NO in the referendum. Again, this is consistent with a large literature showing that in rich countries, the high-skilled are systematically more pro-trade and pro-immigration than the low-skilled, which can be easily explained with reference to these groups' differing experiences of globalization.

Voter turnout in the Lisbon referendum

The constituency-level analysis presented earlier in this report pointed to the occurrence of greater voter dropoff between the 2007 election and the Lisbon referendum in more rural constituencies (as indicated by the map of voter dropoff and as measured by the proportion of farmers in a constituency). Here we examine this matter briefly using the individual-level data. Figures 9 and 10 present graphical summaries of multivariate analyses of abstention (Figure 9) and of dropoff (Figure 10) – the latter being measured by having voted in all elections since becoming eligible to vote and not having voted in the Lisbon referendum.



Figure 9: Absolute values of coefficients explaining abstention

Note: All variables are dummy variables, except for objective knowledge of the treaty and attitude towards immigration, which are standardized scales of ten point scales. Open circles represent negative coefficients; the lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Lines that cross the dotted vertical line correspond to statistically insignificant coefficients at a 95% level. Age variables are relative to the 65+ age group and education is relative to primary education only.

Overall abstention in the Lisbon Treaty referendum is subject to two main influences – age and knowledge. It should be noted that the age factor is not confined to the under twenty-fives. The age groups 25 to 34 and even those aged 35 to 49 also contribute significantly and substantially to the rate of abstention. However, the second most important determinant of abstention is knowledge of the Lisbon Treaty, as measured by our nine-item index of knowledge of the provisions of the treaty. The slogan "If you don't know, vote no" is only half the story. What Figure 9 demonstrates is that the other side of the story is rooted in the maxim – "If you don't know, don't vote".

The explanation of voter dropoff mainly involves three variables – being under 25, having low objective knowledge of the treaty and being a farmer – all thee variables contributing to higher voter dropoff. Though its p value (0.099) is on the margin of

statistical significance, this confirmation of the contribution of the farmer variable is worth noting in that it confirms the farmer effect identified in the constituency-level analysis. The latter only allowed us to conclude that farming *areas* contributed to higher voter dropoff. In the light of the individual-level findings in Figure 10, we can go a step further and conclude that farmers as individuals contributed to voter dropoff.



Figure 10: Absolute values of coefficients explaining dropoff

Note: All variables are dummy variables, except for objective knowledge of the treaty and attitude towards immigration, which are standardized scales of ten point scales. Open circles represent negative coefficients; the lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Lines that cross the dotted vertical line correspond to statistically insignificant coefficients at a 95% level. All coefficients are based on a multinomial regression with the response categories. Age variables are relative to the 65+ age group and education is relative to primary education only.

Conclusion

This analysis shows that the outcome of the 2008 referendum on the Lisbon Treaty was determined mainly by a combination of (a) overall attitudes to European integration, (b) knowledge or lack of knowledge of the European Union and correct and incorrect perceptions of what was in the Lisbon Treaty, (c) a number of specific policy concerns and (d) some domestic political factors.

The overall positive attitude that Irish people have towards the European Union contributed substantially to support for the Lisbon Treaty in the referendum and was indeed the strongest single factor affecting people's voting decision. This is an important finding because this widespread supportive attitude, which is regularly confirmed in Eurobarometer surveys, is sometimes dismissed as unlikely to have any impact on behaviour. This is clearly not the case.

A low level of knowledge about Europe and about the treaty had a double effect by, firstly, making people more likely to abstain and then, for those who did vote, increasing the likelihood of that vote being NO. In particular, low levels of overall knowledge of what was in the treaty had a very powerful effect on increasing the NO vote. This conclusion regarding the importance of knowledge is very robust in that it is confirmed by evidence ranging from responses to open-ended questions, on the one hand, to multivariate analysis using objective indicators of knowledge on the other.

Further statistical analysis showed that there were two dimensions of knowledge at work. The first was the degree to which a person perceived provisions to be in the treaty that *are* in the treaty. The second dimension was the extent to which people perceived things to be in the treaty that *are not* there, namely the introduction of conscription to a European army, the end of Ireland's control over its rate of corporate tax and the end of Irish control over its policy on abortion.

These two sub-sets of perceptions of the contents of the treaty had opposite effects on vote choice, a high score on the correct perception sub-set leading to a YES vote and a high score on the incorrect perception sub-set leading to a NO vote. The latter finding strongly suggests that the failure to convince or reassure people that the issues of corporate taxation, of abortion and of conscription were not in the Lisbon Treaty played a substantial role in the defeat of the ratification proposal.

Other aspects of attitudes to integration including a perception that the EU means lower wage rates, a desire to strengthen neutrality, anti-immigration sentiment and an exclusively Irish sense of identity also increased the propensity to vote NO. In some of our analysis a perception that improved protection of workers' rights was contained in the treaty and/or a concern about the protection of workers' rights were shown to have some impact on voting decisions but any such effects tended to be subsumed into more general attitudes to integration once the latter were included in the models. However, in the context of and controlling for a limited number of mainly socioeconomic variables, belief in the need for improved protection of workers' rights did lead to an increase in the NO vote.

Analysis also points to the differential effect of a number of socio-economic variables on the probability of voting NO. The variables are the belief that the EU means low wage rates, the occupational status of being a large farmer and level of education. The fact that these effects are conditional on participation in the labour suggests that we should think of them as operating through labour market channels and as demonstrating the impact of economic interests on voting decisions. The fact that the education effect only works for those in the labour force is particularly noteworthy, as it suggests that it is not so much education per se that matters, but rather education as it relates to people's experience in the labour market. In the light of this we believe that education is acting here as a proxy for skill levels, as it has been shown to do in many international studies, and that, the higher the skill level, the less likely is it that the person involved will have voted NO in the referendum.

It should also be emphasised that the impact of occupationally-defined social class persisted through these various analyses and so could not be explained away by reference to less education or low skill or any of the other variables analysed.

In addition to the above, voters were concerned about two particular policy issues and both concerns tended to increase the NO vote. The first concern is about the scope of EU decision-making and the belief that too many issues are decided on by the EU. This belief contributed significantly to the NO vote.

The second policy-related concern has to do with the EU decision-making process and specifically with the issue of the rotating commissionership. Eighty per cent of Irish people believe that the commissionership is an important issue for Ireland; 65 per cent said it was an important issue in making up their minds how to vote and 17 per cent put it at the very top of their agenda of issues of importance to Ireland in the EU. A

multivariate analysis controlling for a wide range of variables showed that the belief that it is important for Ireland to maintain a permanent presence in the Commission was a statistically significant and substantial consideration in leading people to vote NO.

The foregoing wide range of influences on the voters' decisions runs counter to the commonly held view that referendums in general and this referendum in particular are "really" decided by the balance of political forces at national level and have little to do with was the issues nominally at stake. It is indeed true that domestic political factors played a role, a NO vote being more likely if a person felt close to an opposition party, or was dissatisfied with the government, or had a negative evaluation of their own economic situation. However, government satisfaction is clearly only one factor among these three and, indeed, one among many others, a point that is borne out by the record of the varying relationship between level of government satisfaction and EU referendum outcomes in Ireland between 1998 and 2008. In short, satisfaction with the government is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for winning a referendum on EU issues in Ireland.

The defeat by referendum of the proposal to ratify the Treaty of Lisbon in Ireland in June 2008 was the product of a complex combination of factors. These included attitudes to Ireland's membership of the EU, to Irish-only versus Irish-and-European identity and to neutrality. The defeat was heavily influenced by low levels of knowledge and by specific misperceptions in the areas of abortion, corporate taxation and conscription. Concerns about policy issues (the scope of EU decision-making and a belief in the importance of the country having a permanent commissioner) also contributed significantly and substantially to the treaty's downfall, as did the perception that the EU means low wage rates. Social class and more specific socio-economic interests also played a role, the latter being shown by the differential effects of certain variables conditional on participation/non-participation in the labour force. Finally, while domestic politics played a role, it was only one factor among many. The complexity just summarised is undeniable. Equally undeniable is the need to address the issues and the underlying processes involved, not just now and not just in the run-up to a referendum but on an on-going and long-term basis.

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APPENDIX 1:

QUESTIONNAIRE AND TOPLINE RESULTS

41108393

Lisbon Treaty Public Opinion Poll Topline Results © Millward Brown IMS: September 2008

Fieldwork Dates – 24th – 31st July 2008

Base: (2,101) All Adults 18+ Unless Otherwise Stated

- A Are you a citizen of Ireland **and** on the Electoral Register i.e. eligible to vote in Irish Referendums?
- Q.1a) On the 12th June last, a referendum was held on the Treaty of Lisbon. As you may remember, many people did not vote in that referendum. How about you? Did you vote in the referendum on the Treaty of Lisbon that was held in June?

IF VOTED (CODE 1 AT Q.1a) ASK, OTHERS GO TO Q4:

Q.1b) How did you vote in that referendum - in favour or against the Lisbon Treaty? *Base: All Who voted (1,354)*

SHOW CARD

- Q.1c) Using this card, can you tell me roughly when did you make up your mind how you would vote in that referendum? *Base: All Who voted (1,354)*

% me the referendum was announced

Q.2a) What were the main reasons why you voted in **Favour/Against (AS APPROPRIATE)** the Lisbon Treaty in the referendum last month? **Were there any other reasons? And anything else?** *Base: All Who voted (1,354)*

SONS FOR VOTING YES:	%
Any mention of attitudinal reasons	
EU has been/is good for Ireland (unspecified)	
Treaty is good for Ireland (unspecified)	16
Felt it was the right thing to do	14
Feel European/am a supporter of European integration	
EU has been/is good for Irish economy	
Treaty makes EU more efficient/allows it to develop/progress	
Ireland needs to belong fully to EU	
Maintain Irish influences in Europe	
Treaty is good for Europe	3
Any mention of followed advice	
Followed advice of Government	
Followed advice of parties	6
Followed advice of family/friends	
Any mention of campaign arguments/protagonists	6
* NOTE: Answers under 3% not shown	
SONS FOR VOTING NO:	%
SONS FOR VOTING NO: Any mention of information, knowledge, understanding	% 45
Any mention of information, knowledge, understanding	45
	45 42
Any mention of information, knowledge, understanding Lack of information, knowledge, understanding, treaty too complex Not sure of opinion so voted no	45 42 3
Any mention of information, knowledge, understandingLack of information, knowledge, understanding, treaty too complexNot sure of opinion so voted noAny mention of issues attributed to Lisbon	
Any mention of information, knowledge, understandingLack of information, knowledge, understanding, treaty too complexNot sure of opinion so voted noAny mention of issues attributed to LisbonLisbon treaty a bad deal, bad for Ireland	
Any mention of information, knowledge, understandingLack of information, knowledge, understanding, treaty too complexNot sure of opinion so voted noAny mention of issues attributed to Lisbon	
Any mention of information, knowledge, understanding. Lack of information, knowledge, understanding, treaty too complex Not sure of opinion so voted no Any mention of issues attributed to Lisbon Lisbon treaty a bad deal, bad for Ireland. Loss of/diminution of Irish neutrality	
Any mention of information, knowledge, understanding. Lack of information, knowledge, understanding, treaty too complex Not sure of opinion so voted no Any mention of issues attributed to Lisbon Lisbon treaty a bad deal, bad for Ireland. Loss of/diminution of Irish neutrality Loss of Irish Commissioner on rotating basis	
Any mention of information, knowledge, understanding Lack of information, knowledge, understanding, treaty too complex Not sure of opinion so voted no Any mention of issues attributed to Lisbon Lisbon treaty a bad deal, bad for Ireland Loss of/diminution of Irish neutrality Loss of Irish Commissioner on rotating basis	
Any mention of information, knowledge, understanding Lack of information, knowledge, understanding, treaty too complex Not sure of opinion so voted no Any mention of issues attributed to Lisbon Lisbon treaty a bad deal, bad for Ireland Loss of/diminution of Irish neutrality Loss of Irish Commissioner on rotating basis Any mention of attitudes to referendum process Didn't have confidence in Government/they were secretive and cagey – failed to provide information and arguments	
Any mention of information, knowledge, understanding	
Any mention of information, knowledge, understanding Lack of information, knowledge, understanding, treaty too complex Not sure of opinion so voted no Any mention of issues attributed to Lisbon Lisbon treaty a bad deal, bad for Ireland Loss of/diminution of Irish neutrality Loss of Irish Commissioner on rotating basis Any mention of attitudes to referendum process Didn't have confidence in Government/they were secretive and cagey – failed to provide information and arguments	45 42
Any mention of information, knowledge, understanding	45 42 3 26 8 5 4 20 6
Any mention of information, knowledge, understanding Lack of information, knowledge, understanding, treaty too complex Not sure of opinion so voted no Any mention of issues attributed to Lisbon Lisbon treaty a bad deal, bad for Ireland Loss of/diminution of Irish neutrality Loss of Irish Commissioner on rotating basis Any mention of attitudes to referendum process Didn't have confidence in Government/they were secretive and cagey – failed to provide information and arguments Didn't like being told how to vote without agreements being given/ being bullied and pushed into voting yes Not convinced by Yes arguments Any mention of loss of power/independence/identity	45 42 3 26 8 5 4 4 20 6 4 3 4 16
Any mention of information, knowledge, understanding	45 42 3 26 8 5 4 20 20

Q.2b) When you had made up your mind how to vote in the referendum, how certain were you about your decision to vote in favour of/against (as appropriate) the Treaty. Were you?
Base: All Who voted (1,354)

	Pretty certain	
•	Don't Know/NA2	

SHOW CARD

READ OUT ↓ Base: All Who voted (1,354)	Very Important (5)	-	Neither /Nor (3)	Not very Important (2)	Not at all Important (1)	Don't know	Mean Score
 Protection of Irish neutrality	6 41		7	9	4	3	4.03
Loss of Irish Commissioner for 5 out of every 15 years		33	12	13	5	5	3.77
□ To keep Ireland's veto on corporate taxation	i31	41	11	7	3	7	3.98
□ To protect Ireland's policy on abortion	29	32	15	12	7	5	3.66
□ To protect workers' rights	ó46	40	7	3	1	3	4.32
□ To prevent too much EU regulation							
□ To strengthen Europe's role in the world	<u>31</u>		14	10	3	5	3.87
□ To maintain Ireland's influence within the EU	<u>42</u>		8	6	2	3	4.18
□ To enable the EU to be more efficient							
□ Because I did not understand the issues involved							

IF DID NOT VOTE (CODE 2 AT Q.1a) ASK: OTHERS GO TO Q.5

Q.4 Why did you not vote? Were there any other reasons? And anything else? Base: All Who did Not Vote (744)

EASONS FOR NOT VOTING:	%
Any mention of voluntary abstention	
Lack of understanding/lack of information/too complicated	
Couldn't be bothered/not interested	
Undecided/uncertain what way to vote/confused	
Campaigns unsatisfactory	2
Opposed to/did not like Lisbon Treaty	
Not interested in politics	
Dislike/distrust politicians/politics	2
Any mention of circumstantial abstention	
Away from home (unspecified)	
Away from home (holiday)	7
Away from home (holiday) Registration/voting card problem	
	4
Registration/voting card problem	4 4
Registration/voting card problem Too busy/no time (unspecified)	
Registration/voting card problem Too busy/no time (unspecified) Too busy/no time – work constraints	

* NOTE: Answers Under 2% Not Shown

Q.5 In the near future, do you see yourself as...? Base: All Adults 18+ (2,101)

	%
Irish only	
Irish and European	
European and Irish	

- European only......1

SHOW CARD

Q.6	By the date of the referendum (12th June), how good was your understanding of the issues involved? Plea	ase use
	this card to choose the phrase that applies best to you.	
	0/	

	% 0
•	I had a good understanding of what the Treaty was all about9
•	I understood some of the issues but not all that was involved
•	I was only vaguely aware of the issues involved
•	I did not know what the Treaty was about at all
•	Don't Know/NA1

SHOW CARD

Q.7 And how about the European Union in general? Using this scale, how much do you feel you know about the European Union, its policies, its institutions?

	%	
1	Nothing at all10	
2	9	
3		
4		
5		
6		
7	9	
8	6	
9		
10 ♦	Know a great deal1	
Don't k		
Mean S	core4.46	

Q.8 For each of the following statements about the European Union could you please tell me whether you think it is true or false?

		True	False	Don't Know
The EU currently consists of fifteen Member States	%	27	49	24
• Switzerland is a member of the European Union	%	21	51	27
 Every six months, a different Member State becomes the President of the Council of the European Union 				
 The members of the European Parliament are directly elected by the citizens of the EU 				

- Q.9 Generally speaking, do you think that Ireland's membership of the European Union (European Community) is ...?
- Q.10 In general, does the European Union conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative image?

SHOW CARD

Q.11 Do you think that, as a result of the NO vote in the Lisbon Treaty referendum, Ireland's influence in the European Union has been strengthened, weakened or remains unchanged?



SHOW CARD

Q.12 Do you think that, as a result of the NO vote in the Lisbon Treaty referendum, Ireland's **economic prospects** have been improved or disimproved or remain unchanged?

- SHOW CARD
- Q.13 Do you think that, as a result of the no vote in the Lisbon Treaty referendum, Ireland's **ability to attract foreign investment** has been strengthened, weakened or remains unchanged?

	%	
•	Very much strengthened (2)1	
•	Somewhat strengthened (1)6	
•	Unchanged (0)49	
•	Somewhat weakened (-1)24	
•	Very much weakened (-2)3	
•	Don't know17	
•	Mean Score0.29	

0/

SHOW CARD

Q.14 Which of the following comes closest to your own view?

	70
• In the light of the result of the referendum, Ireland's interests are best pursued by	60
remaining fully involved in the EU	
In the light of the result of the referendum, Ireland's interests are best pursued by	
opting to be less involved in the EU	
 Don't know 	

SHOW CARD

Q.15 What does the European Union mean to you personally?

º/o
• Peace
Economic prosperity46
Democracy
• Workers' rights
• Our freedom to travel, study and work anywhere in the EU55
Cultural diversity
• Stronger say in the world
• The Euro
• Unemployment
Bureaucracy16
• Waste of money
Loss of our cultural identity
• More crime
• A lot of immigration
Loss of independence
Lower wage rates9
• Other (SPONTANEOUS)1
Don't Know

Q.16 I have a number of statements here that people sometimes make. I would like you to indicate on this scale which of each pair of opposing statements comes closest to your view. A score of one would indicate that you agree fully with the statement on the left. A score of nine would indicate that you agree fully with the statement on the left. Of course your view could be somewhere in between. Also of course there may be issues that you have no particular view on. If so, please just say this and we will move on to the next item.

the v and	n quite satis vay in whic decisions he Europea (1)	h policies are made	-					with the v policies a are ma Europe	e dissatisfied way in which nd decisions ade in the ean Union (9)	No Opinion/ Don't Know	Mean Score
%	5	6	11	11	17	12	11	7	7	14	4.86
The Euro	b) SHOW big countr opean Union o much pov influenc (1)	ies in the n have far wer and	•				→	the Euro are well a their ow	countries in pean Union ble to defend m interests (9)	No Opinion/ Don't Know	Mean Score
%	11	11	11	11	12	13	9	7	4	11	4.89
lı ev strei even Eu oper	c) SHOW reland shou rerything it ngthen its r if this mea less involve iropean Uni ation on for defence po (1)	Ild do can to neutrality ins being ed in ion co- reign and					_ →	willing limitati neutrality be more f in Europe operation and defe	should be to accept ons on its so that it can ully involved an Union co- n on foreign ence policy (9)	No Opinion/ Don't Know	Mean Score
%	14	9	10	8	12	13	11	7	4	13	4.76

Q.16a) SHOW CARD

SHOW CARD

Q.17 Using the card provided please indicate whether Ireland is made a worse or a better place to live in by people coming to live here from other countries? **SINGLE CODE**

	%	
1	Worse place to live11	
2	6	
3	9	
4	9	
5		
6		
7		
8		
9	5	
10	Better place to live	
Don	t know3	
	n Score	

SHOW CARD

Q.18 European integration has been focussing on various issues in the last years. In your opinion, which aspects, if any, should be emphasised by the European Institutions in the coming years.

%
• The Single Market17
• Environment Issues40
 Human Rights Issues44
 Development Issues
• Peace Keeping
 Immigration Issues40
• The fight against crime48
• Energy issues47
 Solidarity with the EU's poorer regions21
• None of these*
• Other2
Don't know7

Q.19 Which of the following do you think are included in the Lisbon Treaty?

	Yes	No	Don't Know
\Box Loss of Irish Commissioner for 5 out of every 15 years	65	9	26
□ Ending of Ireland's right to decide its own corporate tax rate	43	22	35
\Box The introduction of conscription to a European army	33	37	30
□ The reduction of Ireland's voting strength in the Council of Ministers %	48	18	34
\Box The end of Ireland's control over its policy on abortion	34	33	33
\Box The erosion of Irish neutrality	42	30	29
□ Improved efficiency of EU decision-making	56	15	29
□ Strengthening Europe's role in the world	61	12	27
□ Improved protection of workers' rights	49	19	32
□ Strengthening the role of National Parliaments in EU decision-making %	43	20	37
□ The Charter of Fundamental Rights	36	14	50

SHOW CARD

Q.20 There has been a lot of discussion recently about the European Union. Some people say that too many issues are decided on by the European Union, others say that more issues should be decided on by the European Union. Which of the following statements comes closest to your view?

		%
•	Too many issues are decided on by the European Union	32
•	The number of issues decided on by the European Union at present is about right	29
•	More issues should be decided on by the European Union	5
•	I have not really thought about it	18
•	It depends on the issue	7
	Don't Know/NA	9

SHOWCARD

Q.21 In light of the referendum result, how important in your view are the following issues for Ireland within the EU?

		Very Important (5)	Important (4)	Neither /Nor (3)	Not very Important (2)	Not at all Important (1)	Don't know	Mean Score
 Each Member State having an EU Commissioner 	%	38	40	7	5	1	9	4.19
 Ireland retaining full control over its corporation tax 	%	39	40	8	2	*	10	4.29
• Ireland retaining its military neutrality	%	41	39	7	4	1	7	4.24
 Ireland retaining full control over its abortion law 	%	35	36	13	6	2	7	4.03
 Ensuring that workers' rights are protected 	%	53	36	4	1	*	6	4.50
 Ireland retaining control over its public services such as health and education 	%	45	35	7	4	1	7	4.28
 Ensuring that there is not too much EU regulation 	%	35	41	11	5	1	7	4.12

SHOW CARD

Q.22 Which one of these is the **most** important to you? The **second** most important? The **least** important?

	Most Important %	2 nd Most Important %	Least Important %
Each Member State having an EU Commissioner	17	12	14
Ireland retaining full control over its corporation tax	13	16	11
Ireland retaining its military neutrality	18	15	11
Ireland retaining full control over its abortion law	7	9	19
 Ensuring that workers' rights are protected 	20	23	6
 Ireland retaining control over its public services such as health and education 	18		10
• Ensuring that there is not too much EU regulation	6	6	

SHOW CARD

Q.23 There are many different ways in which people get information in relation to referendums. I have a list here of several possible sources of information. Please say how useful, if at all, you found each of them in the lead up to the referendum on the Lisbon Treaty on 12th June. Using this card, would you say you found each of the sources mentioned very valuable, somewhat valuable, of little or no value, or did you not notice or come across the source in question at all?

Very Valuable (4)	Some- What Valuable (3)	Of Little or No Value (2)	Did Not Don't Notice/Know/ Come acrossNA (1)	
Advertisements put out by the Referendum Commission.	. % 4	24	48	. 16
\Box The booklet put out by the Referendum Commission	. %6	27		. 15 5 2.25
\Box The booklet put out by the Government	. %5	25	51	. 14 5 2.22
□ The activities of the National Forum on Europe	. %3	17	36	. 31 14 1.90
□ Newspaper articles	. %12	46	29	7
□ Internet Websites*	. %3	9	12	.45
□ YES vote pop up adverts on the internet*	. %1	7	13	.48
\Box NO vote pop up adverts on the internet*	. %1	6	14	.48
□ Television news and current affairs programmes	. %19	43	27	5
□ National radio news and current affairs programmes	. %18	41	28	7
□ Local radio news and current affairs programmes	. %12	34	32	. 15 8 2.47
□ National radio phone-in/text-in programmes	. %8	25	34	.22
□ Local radio phone-in/text-in programmes	. %7	21	33	.26
Canvassers calling to my home campaigning for a YES vote	. %3	12	28	.4891.66
Canvassers calling to my home campaigning for a NO vote	. %3	12	27	.49
□ Leaflets/brochures circulated by the parties and organisations campaigning for a YES vote	. %3	22	46	. 21 8 2.08
□ Leaflets/brochures circulated by the parties and organisations campaigning for a NO vote	. %4	21	47	. 20
□ Leaflets or free newspapers available in churches advocating a NO vote	. %3	13	36	. 37 10 1.79
Discussion with family, friends and colleagues	. %15	40	29	9
□ YES posters on poles and billboards	. %2	14	60	. 17
□ NO posters on poles and billboards	. %3	13	59	. 17

Q24-27 asked of those who saw information on the Internet (610)

SHOWCARD

Q.24 Which of these best describes the **types of website** that you visited?

Q.25 Which type would you say you visited most often?

Q.26 Which would you say were most useful to you in determining how you eventually decided to vote?

Q.27 Did you **contribute to discussion boards** or blogs on any of these websites, if yes, which ones?

	Q.24	Q.25	Q.26	Q.27
	%		%	
YES Campaign Websites	25	9	7	5
NO Campaign Websites	23	14	11	6
				15
 Not Stated/Don't Know 	43	46	54	77

SHOW CARDQ.28 Overall are you generally satisfied or dissatisfied with the way the government running the country?	 Very satisfied (4)
 Q.29 Thinking about the general elections simyou have become eligible to vote, would say that, as far as you can remember, you have? READ OUT – SINGLE CO. 	you Voted in most of them
Q.30 What about your own economic situation these days? Would you say it is?	• Very good (4)
 Q.31a) Do you feel close to any of the political parties? Which one is that? IF NO Q.31b) Do you feel yourself a little closer to one of the political parties than the others? Which one is that? *Base: All not close to a political party (1,051) 	Q.31a Q.31b* Feel Close to A Little Closer To % %

%

CLASSIFICATION DETAILS

SEX: Male Female	
MARITAL STATUS Married/living as married Single Widowed/divorced/separated	
REGION Dublin Rest of Leinster Munster Connaught / Ulster	27 28 19
AGE 18-21 22-24 25-34 35-49 50-64 65+	
CLASS: AB C1 C2 DE F50+ F50	27 24 26 7
RESPONDENT IS:- Housewife*Self-employed* * Employee Unemployed/searching for a job Unemployed/not searching for a job Student	

Retired......9

* IF SELF EMPLOYED/EMPLOYEE STATE INDUSTRY TYPE:	%
Building/construction	
Computers / IT	2
Finance	
Agriculture	
Food production	
Government/Civil Service/Teaching/Healthcare	12
Manufacturing	4
Professionals (Doc, lawyer, accountant, architect Retail/wholesale/distribution	2
Tourism/travel	
Other Services	
Other write in	6
* RESPONDENT WORKS IN:	%
Public sector	
Private sector	. 40
FINISHED EDUCATION:	%
At primary level	
At secondary level	
At third level	
Still at school/college	4
ATTENDS MASS/CHURCH SERVICE:	%
Daily	2
Weekly	
Several times a month	
Only occasionally	. 36
Never	
NO. OF PEOPLE IN H'HOLD (Incl Responden	t)
1	13
2	
3	
4	
5+	
-	
	1